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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over the City's appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(e)(2001).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue presented: Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Salt Lake City failed
to present sufficient information to show that the dispatch relaying the informant's tip
was based on reasonable suspicion.
Standard of Review: In State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1993),
the Supreme Court established:
This court will find that clear error exists only if the factual findings made
by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena. 869
P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However, this court reviews the trial court's
conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936; accord
State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782
(Utah 1991).
This Court also has stated:
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we
will not overturn [its] factual findings absent clear error. The trial court's legal
conclusions, however, we review for correctness. State v. Navanick. 1999 UT
App 265, ^f 7, 987 P.2d 1276 (internal citations omitted); see also State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996).

iv

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and question suspect—Grounds
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a
public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,

]

Plaintiff/Appellant.

)>

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

[

Case No. 20060929-CA

vs.
TIM KELLY BENCH,
Defendant/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 12, 2005, Mr. Bench's vehicle was stopped by Salt Lake City
Police Officer Justin Hudson at 9:45 p.m. Officer Hudson testified at a Motion to
Suppress Hearing in Third District Court that he overheard a call on the radio
dispatch regarding a male reported as possibly driving while intoxicated. R. 130
at 11, 15. (The transcript of the officer's testimony and the trial court's decision
is contained at Addendum A.) Hudson R. 130 at 15. The officer testified on
direct examination that the information he received from dispatch was that an exwife had called the police and stated that a male had transported children while
intoxicated. R. 109; R. 130 at ll. 1

1

On cross examination the officer agreed that the ex-wife had called and said the
ex-husband had dropped off the kids and that she thought he might be intoxicated.
R. 130 at 15.
1

The officer testified that the radio dispatch report contained the exhusband's name, his address, the description and license plate of the vehicle. R.
130 at 11, 15. No information about the basis of the belief that the ex-husband
might be intoxicated was provided over the dispatch. R. 130 at 15. Officer
Hudson indicated that he was not on call at the time, nor was he looking for the
vehicle when he observed a vehicle matching the description of the reported
vehicle. He made a u-turn and followed the vehicle for two blocks. R. 130 at 13,
19. The officer testified that once he began to follow the vehicle, the vehicle
slowed down to 25 miles per hour (10 miles per hour below the speed limit of 35)
and then subsequently signaled for a lane change for 5 seconds (two seconds more
than the minimum required signal time of three seconds). R. 130 at 13.
The officer further testified that despite no traffic violation, the driver's
reduction in speed, made the officer suspicious about his impairment and together
with the dispatch report supported his decision to make a traffic stop. R. 130 at
13-14,20-21.
On cross examination the officer conceded that he did not observe the
driver violate any traffic law nor did he observe any equipment violation on the
vehicle. R. 130 at 19.
The officer arrested Mr. Bench for Driving under the Influence.

Counsel

for Mr. Bench filed, inter alia, a Motion to Suppress Based on Lack of Reasonable
Suspicion to Initiate Traffic Stop. R. 63-67. The evidentiary hearing consisting
of the above testimony of the officer was held on June 20, 2006, where the City's
2

only witness was the officer. R. 130. The ex-wife who made the call providing
the information to the police was subpoenaed but was not called and did not
testify. R. 49; R. 130.
The trial court granted the Motion to Suppress and directed that findings of
fact and conclusions of law be prepared with specific directions to include that the
traffic concerns did not support a basis to justify the stop and that under a totality
of the circumstances analysis, together with the dispatch call did not provide
enough information to support the stop due to a lack of detail and description
provided. R. 108-112; R. 130 at 26-28. (The trial Court's Findings of Facts and
Conclusions of Law are found in Addendum B.)
This appeal by the City followed. R. 113-114.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The order of the Honorable Paul G. Maughan, Third Judicial District Court
Judge, to suppress the evidence obtained in this case in violation of constitutional
safeguards should be affirmed on appeal. In this case Salt Lake City failed to meet
its burden to establish reasonable articulable suspicion that the stop of Mr.
Bench's vehicle was within Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment requirements.
Police Officer Hudson relied on a police dispatch call based on an ex-wife's
unsubstantiated claim that Mr. Bench had transported the children while
intoxicated.

3

The officer's reliance on the dispatch call originating from the ex-wife
informant also was fatally flawed as the City was unable to establish the informant
as a reliable tipster. The ex-wife informant provided insufficient detail of
observed criminal activity and the officer also failed to independently corroborate
a crime through personal observation as required by the constitution.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT SALT LAKE CITY
FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO SHOW THAT
THE DISPATCH RELAYING THE INFORMANT'S TIP WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE SUSPICION.
Based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and well-established case authority interpreting these rights, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving that an officer had a sufficient basis to
support an investigatory stop. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah App.
1994); State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 7 (Utah App. 1994).
At a minimum, an officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that a
driver has committed or is committing a traffic or criminal offense before lawfully
affecting the stop of a driver. The Utah Supreme Court has held:
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of
the stop.
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)(this standard also has been
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 as amended)).

4

The Lopez Court established constitutional reasonableness for a traffic stop
as permissible only if made (1) incident to a violation committed in the officer's
presence, or (2) if the officer can articulate sufficient suspicion—based on
reason—that the driver is committing a traffic offense or is otherwise engaged in
more serious criminal activity. Id. Without a minimum of reasonable articulable
suspicion an officer may not legally stop a vehicle or detain its occupants.
Whenever an officer affects a stop for an alleged offense committed outside
of his presence, the stop must be evaluated objectively. State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d
1107, 1111 (Utah App. 1988). Such an evaluation requires a determination
"whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences which fairly
might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in his position would
be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense." State v.
Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996). These requirements ensure that the
stop is reasonable at inception consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968).
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence requires that the standards applied to the
review of a warrantless arrest are at least as stringent as the standards applied to a
magistrate's assessment of the facts when issuing a warrant. State v. Valenzuela,
37 P.3d 260, If 10, n. 2 (Utah App. 2001)(quotmg Whitelev v. Warden, Wyoming
State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971).
Whiteley is instructive in this case because it reminds that while reliance
on police bulletins or dispatch is permissible, the underlying basis of the
5

dispatch is subject to judicial review and must independently provide a
constitutional basis. Whitelev, 401 U.S. 560, 567-68 (ruling that an otherwise
illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make an arrest where the initial
information is without the sufficient supporting detail and the arresting officer
supplies no corroborative details). The Whiteley Court concluded that petitioner
Whiteley's arrest "violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments; the evidence secured as an incident thereto should
have been excluded from his trial." Id. at 569. (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
This Court has ruled that where the prosecution predicates its justification
for a warrantless intrusion on an informant's tip an examination must be
performed into the "totality of the circumstances to determine whether the
informant's tip, together with police observations, provide probable cause [or as in
this case reasonable articulable suspicion]." State v. Valenzuela, 37 P.2d 260 at ]f
11 (citing Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983)). This Court also has stated:
This inquiry involves 'a practical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances ..., including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge"
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that...
evidence of a crime will be found.
Id (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). In Valenzuela this Court stated that "fain
officer receiving a dispatched message 'may take it at face value and act on it
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forthwith.' " Id at TJ14 (quoting State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1277 n. 5 (Utah
App. 1994)). However, this Court cautioned:
[I]f the investigation results in an arrest and the defendant objects to the
legality of the initial investigatory detention, the [prosecution] is required
to establish that adequate articulable suspicion initially spurred the
dispatch. To do so, the [prosecution] must show that the dispatch relaying
the informant's tip was based on reasonable suspicion, which requires the
reviewing court to probe the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's
tip.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
This Court articulated a three factor analysis in Kaysville City v. Mulcahy,
943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), to assist this practical, common-sense inquiry in
determining the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's report. Four years
later in Valenzuela this Court reviewed and applied those factors in a scenario
analytically helpful to this case at bar. The three factors are as follows:
Our first focus is upon the type of tip or informant involved, granting
identified informants substantially more credibility than anonymous
informants. Next, we examine whether the informant gave enough detail
about the observed criminal activity to support a seizure, and concluded that
a tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant observed the details
personally, instead of relaying information from a third party. Finally, we
examine whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip, noting that an officer can
corroborate the information either by observing the illegal activity, or by
finding the person, and the other material facts substantially as described by
the informant. Moreover, while we stated that where the reliability of the
information is increased, less corroboration is necessary, we also established
that absent a risk to public safety we expect police officers to make
significant independent corroborative efforts to confirm the information.
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 at f 15 (quotations and citations omitted).

7

Examining these three factors in this case of Mr. Bench, the district court's
decision to grant the Motion to Suppress is inarguably both factually and legally
correct. This Court should affirm the trial court's decision that the stop was
violative of Fourth Amendment strictures.

The first factor: type of tip or informant.
The informant in this case is an ex-wife of the suspect who placed her call
to the police after a former husband returned children to her at or before 9:30 in
the evening. While this informant is identified by role, no testimony was provided
at the hearing about her name or her address. Additionally, her role in the matter
is not consistent with a presumption of reliability. Appreciating a bias against an
ex-wife is both practical and reasonable to presume through a common-sense
analysis. For example, the Utah Supreme Court found it noteworthy to comment
in another informant case that the police department in that case had questions
about the veracity and reliability of an ex-paramour who was presenting as an
informant until the very same tip reached the police from an independent source
the following day. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1233. When children are involved in a
relationship between former spouses, it is not uncommon for ex-spouses to
experience conflict and to demonstrate hard feelings for one another. Such strong
feelings too often can result in criminal allegations created by one spouse about
the other spouse.

8

The City's failure to call the ex-spouse informant as a witness is fatal to its
claim that the court erred in granting Mr. Bench's Motion to Suppress for lack of
reasonable articulable suspicion. As stated above, identified informants are given
more credibility than those unidentified. Here, although somewhat identified, the
informant did not appear and testify for the court to evaluate her credibility or to
discern whether any actual bias did or did not exist in this matter. The court's
determination that the City did not meet its burden on this factor is reasonable and
should not be disturbed.
Factor one balances in favor of the conclusion that the information (or lack
thereof) provided by this informant was neither reliable nor sufficient to justify the
officer's stop.

The second factor: whether the informant gave enough detail about the
observed criminal activity.
Here, in factor two, the informant is entitled to little to no reliability.
Likewise, the informant's information is insufficient to justify a stop. The
informant ex-wife provided only a conclusory statement to the dispatch, or at least
dispatch provided only a conclusory allegation from the informant to the detaining
officer. Fatal to the City's case, in this factor, again is the failure of the
prosecution to introduce any evidence establishing the basis of the informant's
belief and tip that Mr. Bench either was or might have been intoxicated.

9

The tip itself is worthy of scrutiny as the officer testified only that the exwife asserted that her ex-husband had dropped off the kids and that she thought he
was intoxicated. R. 130 at 11. No supporting detail "about the observed criminal
activity" was provided: No odor of alcohol. No slurred speech. No stumbling or
falling down.
This Court has indicated that a tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the
informant observed the details personally, instead of relaying information from a
third party. Here, however, the tip only contains detail about Mr. Beach's name,
vehicle and license plate. While some of that information, such as the plate, is
indeed detailed, none of that detail is incriminating. The assertion that he either
was or may have been impaired is without any detail whatsoever and should not be
considered reliable or credible.
In both, Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 and St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165,
(Utah App. 1987), the Court, while utilizing the three factor test discussed herein,
indicated that the informant who tips police that a drunk driver is on the road need
not give details as to why he or she believes the driver is drunk. However, in the
analysis of these factors the Court acknowledged that not all tips are of equal value
establishing reasonable suspicion. Id. at 235. Perhaps, more importantly, the
Court reminded that the burden to establish sufficient articulable facts is on the
prosecution and that while the officer may act on the face value of that tip, that
once challenged the prosecution must—albeit after the fact—establish that
adequate articulable suspicion spurred the dispatch. Id. at 234. Furthermore, the
10

court explained that those tips that are not anonymous are typically higher on the
reliability scale because a known informant "makes it possible for the police to
verify the facts underlying the report." Id. at 235-36 (quoting State v. Roth, 827
P.2d 255, 258 (Utah App. 1992)).
Contrary to the City's claim that more detail exists here than in both
Mulcahy and Carter, the detail provided here, unlike those cases, does not point to
the specific criminal activity of intoxication and is insufficient to support the afterthe-fact analysis that Mulcahy explained is required under a Fourth Amendment
analysis. In both Mulcahy and Carter we know, either from their testimony at the
hearing or the details provided in the dispatch report, that the witnesses there had
names, addresses and direct face to face contact with the suspect. In Mulcahy the
defendant was described as a drunk individual who had been on the tipster's
porch, 943 P.2d at 233; in Carter the defendant had been at the tipster's fast food
drive-through window where the witness personally observed and reported an
open container violation, including watching the suspect drink from and not
discard the beer can, 945 P.2d at 167.
In Mr. Bench's case the City did not produce any after-the-fact testimony
from either the police or the witness. The evidence is free from any detail whether
the tipster herself saw or spoke to Mr. Bench. The information she provided was
even questionable as to whether he was actually intoxicated or just possibly might
have been. We also do not know for sure exactly when Mr. Bench had dropped
off the children. Finally, we don't know for sure whether the ex-wife was a first
11

hand observer or provided hearsay information to the police subsequently sent
over the dispatch.
This second factor is woefully short on whether the informant gave the
sufficient detail required to establish criminal activity to sustain the stop of Mr.
Bench as constitutional. This second factor balances in favor of the trial court's
ruling finding the police stop violative of Mr. Bench's rights against unlawful
seizure.

The third factor: whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the
dispatcher's report of the informant's tip.
The officer in this case was neither on call nor looking for the target of the
dispatch when Mr. Bench's vehicle appeared. Officer Hudson made a u-turn and
then followed Mr. Bench for two blocks before pulling him over. Hudson did not
see Mr. Bench commit a traffic offense. Nothing about Mr. Bench's driving was
unlawful. No typical DUI driving pattern, such as running a stop sign, weaving or
speeding, was observed by the officer. Similarly, no equipment violation was
observed by Hudson. The traffic activities relied on by the officer to justify
stopping Mr. Bench, after making his u-turn and following Mr. Bench, was that he
slowed down to twenty-five miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone and
that he signaled for five whole seconds rather than just the minimum three
required by statute. Again, neither event is against the law or in any way
corroborative of an unsupported assertion that Mr. Bench might be intoxicated.
12

The trial court granted the Motion of Mr. Bench by stating:
[I]n my mind there's clearly not enough evidence to stop—to pull
Mr. Bench over based on his driving pattern.
I mean, if it's not illegal, I mean, if you allow this, then where do
you stop pulling anybody over for anything? You're driving too legally,
you know.
R. 130 at 26; Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R108-112. The trial
court also added its analysis that the dispatch call somewhat broadens the
question, "but certainly not enough in this case." Id. The trial court directed
counsel to prepare findings and conclusions that included there was too little in the
dispatch call and that the lack of detail and description about why she believed he
was impaired, left the call lacking. R.130 at 28; Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law R. 108-112.
Simply stated, the officer did not corroborate the assertion of impairment,
only the vehicle being driven—a non criminal activity. Moreover, the fact the
officer followed Mr. Bench for two blocks without observing any traffic violation
dispels the assertion of the City that he was a risk to public safety. Notably,
without corroboration of the risk to public safety, this Court indicated its desire for
officers to make significant independent corroboration of the information.
Valenzuela, 37 P.3d 260 at Tf 15. Such an independent corroboration did not occur
here. Notably, Mulcahy disagrees with Mr. Bench's assertion that corroboration
needs to be of the criminal activity rather than just locating the suspect. 943 P.2d
at 236. However, the lack of details of the informant's tip in this matter, discussed
supra, also includes that contrary to Mulcahy and Carter where the suspects'
13

driving directions and street locations were provided in the report, the ex-wife
only provided information of the vehicle and Mr. Bench's home address. Because
no information was introduced regarding where the ex-wife lived and/or the
precise time Mr. Bench dropped off the children, this case is comparatively
weaker, not stronger as asserted by the City.
Moreover, this Court's subsequent ruling after Mulcahy noted above in
Valenzuela, that significant independent corroboration is required without the risk
to public safety, runs contrary to the remarks in reliance on the non-directive
authority cited in Mulcahy. Additionally, the officer's testimony regarding
whether the ex-wife's comments through dispatch are less than certain about
whether Mr. Bench was intoxicated at all or just possibly may have been.
This third factor in the analysis, like the two previous factors, balances
more heavily toward a lack of corroboration of material and essential facts
supporting reasonable suspicion and urges this Court to affirm the conclusions of
the trial court.

The totality of the circumstances analysis.
Evaluating the three factors detailed above and employing the appropriate
discretion afforded trial courts in their factual findings, the totality of the
circumstances in this matter supports the trial court's ruling granting the Motion to
Suppress. The ex-wife informant is not entitled to the same presumption of the
other informants reviewed by this Court. Unlike those other informants, she is not
14

without a bias and should be placed low on the reliability scale. Furthermore, the
ex-wife informant here lacks sufficient detail and personal awareness of the
asserted criminal behavior as directed by the Valenzuela opinion. The City's
failure to produce her as a witness to satisfy these concerns is fatal to its appeal.
The third factor, like the other two, again demonstrates an informant who provided
insufficient detail for the officer to corroborate with his own observation sufficient
to satisfy Fourth Amendment concerns.
The trial court expressly held that the totality of the circumstances in this
matter established a violation of the Fourth Amendment and justified suppressing
the evidence as requested by Mr. Bench and as demanded by Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). As no clear error exists in the district court's factual findings
and application of those facts to the law, this Court should affirm the order
suppressing the evidence as requested by Mr. Bench and ruled on by the court.
CONCLUSION
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bench respectfully requests that
the Court affirm the trial court's order suppressing the evidence obtained against
him in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED tMs'j^day

JASON A. S0HATZ, # 9969
Attorney fo/Mr. Bench, Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March, 2007, one original and seven
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were filed with
the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and two additional copies were either hand
delivered or mailed first class to the following:
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
Attn: Aaron W. Flater and Bernadette M. Gomez
Attorneys for Salt Lake City/Appellant
349 South 200 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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THE COURT: Okay.
th(*n.

9

We' 11 talk about the probable cause to stop.
MS. GOMEZ: I will.

10
11

Do you want to call your of f icer,

State calls Officer Hudson.

COURT CLERK: Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth,
th<2 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you G od?

12

THE WITNESS: I do.

13

THE COURT: Come and take the stand, please

14

You may proceed.

15

JUSTIN HUDSON,

16

having been first duly sworn,

17

testified as follows:

18

DIRECT EXAMINATION

19

BY MS

20

Q

21

G OMEZ:
Officer Hudson, will ycu please state and spell your

name for the record.
A

Officer Justin Hudson.

Q

Ana wnere do you wcri;?
What's that?

n

Where do ycu \cr ;?

-10A.

Salt Lake City Police Department.

Q.

And hew long have you worked with the Salt Lake City

Police Department?
A.

Six years.

A little over six years.

Q.

Now, were you on duty on April 12th, 2005?

A.

I was.

Q.

I'm going to go back to ask you a few more questions.

Did you attend the training academy?
A.

I did.

Q.

And what was that?

A.

The Utah POST Academy.

Q.

And at that academy were you trained on detecting

impaired drivers?
A.

We were.

Q.

What type of training was that?

A.

They actually brought in people, volunteers, who

without our knowledge drank different amounts of alcohol; and
then they brought them in for us to test each one of them, and
try to determine what type of alcohol content they had in theii
body before the breath tests.
Q.

Now, besides that alcohol workshop, were you also

trained to detect impaired drivers by certain patterns of
driving?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Ana what Type of driving patterns would you see in

-11
impaired driving?
A.

Simple patterns such as not obeying traffic laws.

Other patterns such as slow driving, just curious driving when
an officer is behind them, things of that nature.
Q.

Okay, you said you were on duty on April 12Cn, 2005.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And at around 10 p.m. did you conduct a stop?

A.

I conducted a stop at 9:42 p.m., yes.

Q.

And where did you conduct the stop?

A.

I was in the Glendaie area, and I overheard a call on

the radio in the Rose Park area regarding a male that had just
—

was transporting children while intoxicated.

report that dispatch gave us.

That was the

I wasn't on the call.

I was

just patrolling a different area, and they -- on the radio they
gave us the address where he might be going; and I happened to
see him driving.
Q.
they —

Was there anything else in the report?

I mean, did

you overheard (inaudible) that there was an intoxicated

person with children in the car?
A.

They just —

information.

I got —

they gave us that initial

They gave us the vehicle description, the

person's name, things like that, and then they also said that
he'd already been there ana left.

Thau's basically this --

over a year later, that's all 1 can remember.

-12abouu?
A.

There was a red truck, I believe, a Dodge.

Q.

And were tnere any other details about the vehicle?

A.

I can't recall any others.

Q.

Did they tell you the location the vehicle would be

traveling?
A.

No, no.

They just gave the location that he had

supposedly lived; and like I said, I wasn't dispatched to the
call.

I was just patrolling a different area of town.
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, I'm sorry, but could we ask

the officer to set his report aside unless he's using it,
specifically being asked to refresh his memory from it?
THE COURT: Sure.

Officer Hudson, you're —

testify as to what you remember.

you can

If you need the report to

refresh your recollection you can use it, but you're not to
just read from or testify from it.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor.
Q.

BY MS. GOMEZ: Now, with that information that you had,

can you tell us where you were at when you conducted the stop?
A.

I conducted the stop on Emery Street.

That's noi

where I came in contact with him.
Q.

And where did you come in contact with him?

A.

Approximately I think it was Navajo and California.

He was aoing eastDound.

I was going westbound when I saw him.

1

*J

1 -J

0.

Is that Salt Lake City jurisdiction?

A.

Yes, it is.

3

Q.

Okay, go ahead and describe --

4

A.

I was just traveling.

I wasn't necessarily looking

5

for him , but as I was traveling westbound I saw a truck

6

matchin g the description.

7

follow the truck and saw the license plate and it was that

So I did a U-turn and began to

8 ! truck. When I turned around and began to follow, the person
9

in the vehicle slowed down about 10 miles an hour under the

10

speed 1 imit.

11

five seconds or so.

12

slow, between 20, 25 miles an hour.

13

attempt ed the stop them, to California and Emery.

14
15

Q.

Then signaled for a great deal of time, about
Then changed lanes and continued going
That's when I tried to --

Okay, I want to ask you a question about that.

As far

as the 25 mile an hour, what is the speed limit on that road?

16

A.

It's 35.

17

Q.

And is slow driving, is that an indicator of alcohol

18

impairment in your training and experience?

19 !

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

xAnd you also mentioned about the five second signal.

21
1O

23

Is that an excessively long time for a signal?
A.

Generally we don't see a signal at all, but yeah,

that's a very long time.
Q.

would that indicate alcoholic impairment?

-.-i .

Well, not necessarily, bun what it indicates to me

!

-14is they know they're being followed and they want to mak-a sure
that I don't pull them over.
look at it.

I think that's usually the way i

I'd been on patrol -- at that point I'd beeii on

4

patrol four-and-a-hal:: years, and when I see somebody driving

5

that carefully, and I' m already paying attention to them for

6

an obvious reason, then that definitely indicates to me 1i:hat

7

something's going on.

That they know I'm there and that they

don't want me to stop them.
Q.

10

Okay, and based on what you observed, coupled with

what you overheard on the radio, did you feel that the

11 I defendant was impaired?
12

A.

Yeah, I did.

I mean, it's suspicious enough to begin

13

with to have somebody be driving that slow and signaling for

14

that long, in my mind, just because I'm following them.

15

coupled with the fact of what I heard over the radio, I assumed

16

he was impaired, yes.

17

MS. GOMEZ: Thank you, Officer.

18

THE COURT: Mr. Schatz.

19
20
21

Then

CROSS EXAMINATION
EY MR. SCHATZ:
Q.

So you're just out driving around and hear this call

22

come over the radio of dispatch saying that there was a male

23

driver who —

did you have any details; did you get any

information about who made the complaint initially?
A.

Yeah, it was -

I heara or, ,he radio that ainpa.en axd

-15
say that it was the ex-wife or wife calling; and she lived in
Rose Park.
Q.

I don't remember the address.

And did you receive any information that the two of

them had been involved in sort of an ongoing custody dispute?
A.
been.

I don't recall that in the report, but it could have
Like I said, it wasn't really my call.

It was just -- I

just overheard it.
Q.

And you said that from what you recall, there was the

description, of the vehicle as a red truck, but you weren't sure
what the make was?
A.

I'm sure at the time I knew what the make was, because

they had the plate and everything.

They always put the plate

and everything on the log, but at that time —

now I can' t

remember exactly what the plate or anything was, no.
Q.

Okay.

Did you get any information about why this

individual felt that —
intoxicated?

had reason to believe that he was

Did they say that he stumbled and fell down the

steps when he dropped the kids off?

Was there any detail about

why that individual was believed to be intoxicated?
A.

I den't know.

Q.

All you know is than his ex-wife had called in a

report and said thai: he had dropped off the kids and she
thought he might be intoxicated?

:act with him at about Navaio Street and California?
Correct.
And then at that point you turned around to follow

4

mm:

5

A.

Right.

6

Q.

And that's when you observed him -- two things.

7

is you said he was driving too slowly.

8

any traffic?

One

Was he interfering with

9

A.

No.

10

Q.

Was there people backed up behind him honking their

11

horn or anything?

12

A.

No.

13

Q.

Are you required to drive the speed limit? •

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Is it illegal not to drive the speed limit?

16

A.

It can be, yes.

17

Q.

It's illegal to go over the speed limit, right?

18

A.

Right.

19

Q.

But it's not illegal to go under the speed limit

20
21

unless you're interfering with other traffic, correct?
A.

Correct.

Q.

So he wasn't committing any sort of traffic violation

by going 2 5 miles an hour in a 35 mile an hour zone?
24

A.

No.

r i g h t , but t n a t was 5 t m _ s u s p i c i o u s to you'.

-17A.

Yes.

Q.

Ail right, and you said that he signaled for five

seconds when changing lanes?
A.

Correct.

Q.

According to Utah code how long does a driver have to

signal when making a lane change?
A.

Three seconds.

Q.

A. minimum of three seconds, correct?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Doesn't say you can't signal for lOxnger than that,

does it?
A.

No.

Q.

And in fact, have you ever pulled somebody over for

not signaling for three seconds?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How often?

A.

Not very often.

Just if they're impeding traffic or

about to cause an accident or something like that.
Q.

So if he wouldn't have signaled you would have pulled

him over, right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Okay, because that's a traffic violation; and you're

saying the difference between three seconds and five seconds,
when the statute savs a minimum of three seconds, you said than

3

A.

In my mind, yes.

Q.

I mean, how long does the average person signal in a

lane change?

4

A.

About one second.

5

Q.

All right, but that would be illegal, then, right?

6

A.

Correct.

7

Q.

And that would give you grounds to stop him?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

So in other words, he didn't violate the lane change

10

statute, did he?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Okay.

So your reason for stopping him was based

13

solely on this sort of undetailed report from an ex-wife, who

14

for all you know, hated her husband's —

15

just wanted to try and get him in trouble?

16
17
18

A.

ex-husband's guts and

That's not the only reason I stopped him, no.

I would

have stopped him anyway, probably.
Q.

So if you would have observed him driving -- say if

19

he'd have been driving 30 miles an hour instead of 25, and he'd

20

only signaled for three seconds instead of five, would you

21

still have pulled him over?

22
23

A.

I can't —

what happened.

I don't know.

I don't know.

Thau's not

So I don't know.

All right.

Well, hypothex

what vou observed, wouic vou have still pu]

.iia L

o

-19A.

I can't really say.

I dor/1 know.

You have to --

every time, everything out there is different every time, so -Q.
this.

Well, on this particular occasion -- let me ask you
Did you take into account those two things as part of

your reason for stopping?
A.

Yes.

Oh, yes.

Q.

Okay, but absent those two things, you don't know if

you'd have pulled him over or not, just based on that report
you heard over dispatch?
A.

I might have pulled him over, just from the suspicion

that he was intoxicated, because of the -- what we had over the
radio.
Q.

I might have stopped him anyway, yes.
Now, when you stopped him —

how long had you followed

him between when you first laid eyes on him until you finally
turned your overhead lights on?
A.

It was two blocks.

I turned my overhead lights on as

we were turning southbound onto Emery.
Q.

Ail right, and during that two-block period did you

observe him commit any illegal traffic violations at all?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you observe any equipment violations?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay, so he wasn't weaving?

A.

No.

Q.

This was —

was this in the middle of the afternoon?

-?n-

^-

It was evemnq.

Q.

Eve

3

A.

Yeah.

4

Q.

Okay.

5

So he wasn't weaving.

He wasn't speeding.

He

didn't run any stop signs?

6

A.

Mo.

7

Q.

He signaled all of his lane changes and turns?

8

A.

Correct.

9

Q.

He didn't go into other lanes or anything like that?

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Okay.

12

So there was nothing about his driving pattern

that violated any sort of traffic laws?

13

A.

No.

14

Q.

And they were not typical of what you would think of

15

an intoxicated driver, were they?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Okay, just because someone has been driving the speed

13

limit?

19

A.

When somebody slows down when I get them behind them,

20

and starts driving like that, yes, that usually is suspicious

21

to me.

22

Q.

Do you find that when you're driving your vehicle,

23

uhat the people around you tend to be more cautious when they

24

know a oolice officer is foliowinq them?
.autious,

yes

Q.

Okay.

A.

No.

3

Q.

I mean

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

Do you find yourself driving maybe a little under the

6

Nobody wants t o g e t a t i c k e r : ,

do t h e y ?

--

speed limit when there's another officer around?

7

A.

No.

8

Q.

I guess maybe you don't have that feeling.

9

A.

No, I don't get that feeling.

10

Q.

Do you think people do that

11

A.

Sure.

12

Q.

-- when they see other officers?

13

A.

(No verbal response).

14

Q.

So why would it be so abnormal when he saw you

—

15

following him, to make sure he wasn't exceeding the speed

16

limit?

1?

A.

18
19
20
21

Isn't that what a driver is supposed to do?
Most people will slow down to about the speed limit.

They don't slow down ten miles an hour under the speed limit.
Q.

Okay, but you had no idea, I mean, exactly why he

slowed down, did you?
A.

I had no idea, no.

That's what's suspicious about it

MR. SCHATZ: I have nothing further.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Gomez.

MS. GOMEZ: I have nothing else for the officer.
THE COURT: Thank vou.

You may step down.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Anything further?
MS. GOMEZ: Your Honor, it seems clear here that there
was reasonable suspicion to stop based on the totality of the
circumstances.

The officer had information from the dispatch

that there was a drunk driver.

I think that the case

law

clearly establishes even if the person hadn't known the person
in the car, that once the officer comes and he is able to match
the description of what the person called in, that that in
itself is reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Here the information he had that this was someone that
knew the defendant.
was drunk driving.

She had called and said that the person
Then when he sees the description matching

the vehicle that was reported from the dispatch, he flips
around in a U-turn and follows the vehicle.

Then at that

time he notices that the vehicle slows way down, ten miles an
hour under the speed limit, and he also notices that he left
his signal on for a long period of time.

I think that those

facts provide the officer with reasonable suspicion for the
stop.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Schatz.

MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, what we have here is a
completely undetailed sort of a blank, "Well, my husband

-23time, he made the decision and what he based his decision en.
In this case all he's got is a report coming over
dispatch from the alleged driver, the defendant's ex-wife.

He

doesn't have any information why she had reason to believe he
was impaired.

There was no detail given as to why she had any

reason to think he had even been drinking.

There's just this

sort of blanket sort of vague argument, I guess, or complaint
made that he was intoxicated.
You know, for all the officer knew, they had just
gotten in an argument over visitation, and she was just trying
to do something to bother him or inconvenience him.

So there

was nothing behind that complaint that would have really given
the officer good reason to believe he was impaired.
Then when he pulled behind him, he observes what he
thinks is the truck, and he says he verified it at the time
with the license plate; but when asked specifically if he
would have pulled the vehicle over absent these two suspicious
driving patterns that he seems to indicate, he can't give us
a definite answer.

I think it's because the answer was he

didn't think he had reason to pull them over just based on that
dispatch alone.
If we look at that those two added factors, I think
they're irrelevant.

Driving 25 miles an hour in a 35 mile

an hour zone, there is absolutely nothing illeqal about that

he'd
law.

have been going a mile over, he'd

have been violating the

So just because he was driving slow, that is not a crime.

4 I That is not reasonable suspicion.
5

It's only a crime if he's impeding traffic; and as

6

the officer indicated, he wasn't blocking any traffic.

7

weren't cars backed up behind him.

8

no reason to stop; and I don't think it necessarily adds that

9

much to the first complaint.

10

There

So that in and of itself is

Second of all, for him to say that signaling for

11

five seconds is an unusually long time I think is absolutely

12

ridiculous.

13

of three seconds.

14

client pulled over and arrested for DUI because he didn't

15

signal for at least three seconds, I probably wouldn't have

16

to be here today.

17

signaled for three seconds versus five.

18

The statute says you have to signal for a minimum
If I had a nickel for every time I had a

He's saying that it was abnormal that he

It's obvious that the officer was looking for any

19

additional excuse to try to pull him over, and he latched onto

20

these two things, which I don't think gives him any additional

21

reason to pull him over, over and above what he had already

22

had, which still didn't give him reasonable suspicion based

23

on this alleged complaint that, you know, he didn't have any

24

detail about.

It was a very vaaue report at that point.
iinly these two arivma patterns ne claims

indicative of people who are imp^
People who run stop signs,

to other sort of driving patte

people who are weaving in their lane or even outside their
lane.

Those are the types of things that certainly are, first

of all, traffic violations and would give an officer a reason
6

to stop; but those are the sort of driving patterns that

7 I much more indicative of someone who's impaired.
During the two blocks that the officer followed
9

him, he committed not a single traffic violation, nor did the

10 I officer observe any sort of an equipment violation.

So I think

11 | under a totality of the circumstances, the officer was simpiy
stretching to try to make a stop; and he stretched it too far,
13 I based on the facts that he knew.

Therefore there wasn't

14 I reasonable suspicion, and any of the evidence he seized after
15
16
17

the stop was illegally obtained.
THE COURT: Okay, thank you.
about five, maybe ten minutes.

We'll be in recess for

I'll be back with the decision.

18

(Recess taken)

19 I

THE COURT: We're back on the record with Salt Lake

10 | City vs. Tim Bench.

I've went in and went over your arguments,

and I realize that totality of the circumstances is kind of a
catchall for a lot of this —

please be seated -- but in my

23 I mind there's clearly not enough evidence to stop —

to pull

Mr. Bench over based on his drivina pattern.
mean, n

it's not m e g a i , i n\€

you allow

-26this, then where do you stop pulling anybody over for anything?
You're driving too legally, you know.

I mean, absent some

3

violation or some impairment -- I know that can be frustrating.

4

I was behind a person driving 30 in a 35 today.

5

irritated because I wanted to go 35 and I had somewhere to get

6

to, but it's not illegal otherwise.

7

I was a little

So then there's the question of does the dispatch

8

call make a difference?

Does that broaden the umbrella?

I

9

think it does somewhat, but certainly not enough in this case.

10

Therefore I'm granting the defendant's motion to suppress the

11

stop.

12

probable cause to pull him over to make the traffic stop.

Find that there's not probable cause —

13
14

So will you prepare the necessary findings and order
on that.

15

MR. SCHATZ: I will, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17
18

sufficient

Then, given that, does the City know

what it wants to do?
MS. GOMEZ: Well, your Honor, I think we'd like to

19

appeal, but I don't know what our appeal rights are.

20

check into that.

So I'll

21

THE COURT: Well, okay, I can set it —

I mean, just so

22

that we don't lose track of it, I can set it on Judge —

23

the problem, though.

24

you can help me.

that's

I don't know the answer to this; maybe

do know that on certa:

*.?i^P^

.

leionv cases, vcu

have to have the Judge that has the file, you have to have -precedence.

If Judge Barrett were to hold a procedural rule on

a procedural motion and then the case got shifted, I'd have to
hear that again on a felony.
misdemeanors.

I don't know if that's true on

Do either of you have any --

MR. GOMEZ: I don't, your Honor.
THE COURT: Because this is shifting

—

MR. SCHATZ: I don't, your Honor.
THE COURT: —
July 1.

this is shifting to Judge Fuchs as of

So if there's an appeal, what I'm going to do is send

it to Judge Fuchs on July 11th at 8:30.

If for some reason it

needs to come back for special attention from me at some point,
I'm happy to take it back, but -MR. SCHATZ: That was July 11th at what time, your
Honor?
THE COURT: At 8:30.

Thau's his next pretrial.

Maybe

the City will know by that time what it wants to do or will
have done.
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, I know that Mr. Bench
obviously has to work.

Since it's mainly going to be a

decision for the City to decide how they wish to proceed,
would the Court be willina to excuse his attendance an than

MS. GOMEZ: What was that date, your Honor?
THE COURT: July ll=h; and it's whether or not

—

MR. SCHATZ: If he doesn't appear, since we're not
going to do anything

—

MS. GOMEZ: No.

That's fine, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, that's fine.
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Schatz, as you prepare this, there's
just too little in the dispatch to broaden that umbrella, is
what I'm saying, in the dispatch call.
MR. SCHATZ: So in essence
THE COURT: The breadth
MR. SCHATZ: —

you're saying that the

—

—

the lack of detail and description

—

THE COURT: Right.
MR. SCHATZ: —

about why she believed he was impaired,

left that call lacking in
THE COURT: Sure.

—
I mean, there's just not enough

information in the dispatch to the officer.
MR. SCHATZ: So in other words, the information

—

THE COURT: Right:.
MR. SCHATZ: —

the officer had knowledge of at the

ime.
THE COURT: Coupled with the drivinq was not enoucrh
the stop.
MR. SCHATZ: Okav.

I'll try to be detailed with

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, your Honor.
(Hearing concluded)
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
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:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

v.

:

CASE NO. 055900194

Tim Bench,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

:

JUDGE MAUGHAN

The above entitled matter came before this court for hearing on the Defendant's Motion
to Suppress on June 20th, 2006. The Plaintiff, Salt Lake City, was present and represented by
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney, Bernadette Gomez. The Defendant was present and
represented by his attorney, Jason Schatz.
The Court first addressed the City's Motion to Strike Hearing which was filed on June
20. 2006. The Court determined that the hearing should proceed with regard to the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress Based on Lack of Reasonable Suspicion to Initiate Traffic Stop. The City
called one witness. Officer Justin Hudson. The defense did not present any witnesses.

\r\CL

FINDINGS OF FACT
After having heard testimony from the City's witness and hearing argument from counsel
for both parties, the court finds that:
1.

Officer Hudson was patrolling the Glendale area of Salt Lake City when he
overheard a dispatch call indicating that a call had been received from a woman in
the Rosepark area stating that her ex-husband may be dr4rving4tfideiUbeHmfh!eBce.
According to Officer Hudson he recalled that the dispatch report described the
vehicle in question as a red Dodge truck. Officer Hudson did not receive any
further detail as to the complaint or information as to why the complaintant
believed her ex-husband was intoxicated. Officer Hudson also heard the
Defendant's home address.

2.

A short time later Officer Hudson observed a vehicle that he believed matched the
description he overhead from dispatch. Officer Hudson observed the Defendant's
truck driving near Navajo Street & California Ave.

3.

After observing the vehicle. Officer Hudson turned around to follow the vehicle.
Officer Hudson then followed the vehicle for approximately two blocks before he
attempted to stop the vehicle. During the two blocks that he followed the vehicle,
he observed that the vehicle slowed to approximately 25 MPH and that the
Defendant signaled for approximately 5 seconds before changing lanes. The
posted speed limit in that area was 35 MPH. Officer Hudson did not observe that
the Defendant was driving erratically or operating his vehicle in an unsafe manner
nor did he observe any traffic or equipment violations.
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4.

Officer Hudson initiated his overhead lights to stop the Defendant's vehicle at the
approximate location of Emery Street.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact the court hereby makes the following

Conclusions of Law:
1.

Officer Hudson did not observe the Defendant commit any equipment or traffic

violations that would justify him in stopping the Defendant's vehicle. Utah law requires
that the driver obey the posted speed limit. Utah law prohibits a driver from driving at
such a low speed that the driver is obstructing the reasonable flow of traffic. The
Defendant was not committing a violation by driving only 25 MHP in a 35 MPH zone.
Utah law requires that a driver signal his intention to make a lane change for at least 3
seconds prior to making the lane change and that the lane change must be made with
reasonable safety. Since the Defendant signaled for 5 seconds and he made the lane
change in a safe and appropriate manner, the Defendant complied with the law regarding
lane changes.
2.

The information obtained by Officer Hudson from the dispatch he overhead was

not sufficient to justify a traffic stop on the Defendant's vehicle.
ORDER
THEREFORE after having fully considered the testimony of the witnesses, evidence, and
the arguments presented, and based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth
above. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Based on Lack of
reasonable Suspicion to Initiate Traffic Stop is GRANTED. Therefore any information or
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evidence obtained following the initial traffic stop of the Defendant's vehicle is hereby
suppressed and excluded from trial in this matter.
DATED this

/'

day of _

. 2006.
BY THE

JUDGEMifij^ANj -^
Third District^Cntfrt
i
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this day. June 21. 2006.1 personally hand delivered or faxed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion
to Dismiss Felony DUI to the following:
Judge Maughan
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 S. State st.
Salt Lake City. UT 84111
Bernadette Gomez
SALT LAKE CITY ATTORNEY
349 S. 200 E., 5th floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Tim Bench
1417 Emery St.
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
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